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Abstract: 
We set up a simple trade model with two countries hosting one firm each. The firms invest in 
cost-reducing R&D, and each government may grant R&D subsidies to the domestic firm. We 
show that it is optimal for a government to provide higher R&D subsidies the lower the level 
of trade costs, even if the firms are independent monopolies. If firms produce imperfect 
substitutes, policy competition may become so fierce that only one of the firms survives. 
International policy harmonization eliminates policy competition and ensures a symmetric 
outcome. However, it is shown that harmonization is not necessarily welfare maximizing. The 
optimal coordinated policies may imply an asymmetric outcome with R&D subsidies to only 
one of the firms. 
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1 Introduction
This paper has two main purposes. The first is to explore the relationship between trade
costs and R&D investments. We show that increased integration (lower trade costs) may
increase both private and social incentives to invest in R&D, and may lead firms to
sell more both domestically and abroad. The second purpose is to study the eﬀects of
policy competition and cooperation in imperfectly competitive international markets, and
in particular to show that R&D subsidies may in fact reduce the number of product
varieties in the market. This turns out to be true both if the subsidies are set in a policy
game between governments maximizing domestic welfare and if the governments set R&D
subsidies cooperatively to maximize aggregate welfare.
These results are developed in a simple two-country model with trade costs, where
each country hosts one firm. The firms produce horizontally diﬀerentiated goods, and
can invest in process-improving R&D to reduce marginal production costs. Freer trade
between the countries implies that the size of the market increases, making it profitable
to invest more in cost-reducing R&D. Thereby marginal production costs and consumer
prices fall. Other things equal, this leads to more export as well as higher sales at home.
The latter implies that the social value of any given R&D investment then increases, due
to higher domestic consumer surplus. Trade liberalization thus induces the government
to increase the subsidy level. It should be noted that the motive for R&D subsidies is
not to promote exports per se; the size of the export market is important only because it
matters for the choice of R&D investments and hence for consumer surplus at home.1
In addition to the consumer-surplus motive for subsidizing R&D, there is also a strate-
gic motive for active R&D policies when firms from diﬀerent countries produce (imperfect)
substitutes. This strategic (‘business stealing’) motive may give rise to policy competition
between the countries. Contrary to many previous studies we find that policy competi-
tion does not necessarily result in too high subsidies; it may, however, lead to unstable
1The eﬀect is similar to what Krugman (1984) labelled ”import protection as export promotion”, in
that it focuses on the links between the size of the market and the marginal costs of production. However,
while Krugman’s focus was on how to promote exports, in our case export is a means to ensure lower
costs and higher domestic sales.
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or asymmetric equilibria. The determining factor in our model is the degree of product
diﬀerentiation. If goods are close substitutes, policy competition may be so fierce that it
is impossible for both firms to survive in the market. Depending on the degree of prod-
uct diﬀerentiation in the industry, we may thus have a stable symmetric equilibrium, an
unstable symmetric equilibrium, or no symmetric equilibria at all. In the latter two cases
there may exist stable asymmetric equilibria where one firm monopolizes the market (and
the other is inactive), even if the countries and the firms at the outset are completely
symmetric.
The outcome of the policy game is inoptimal from a global point of view. Hence, there
is a need for R&D policy cooperation that takes into account profit and consumer surplus
in both countries, and eliminates policy competition. Coordination of R&D policies may
be particularly relevant within closely integrated regions where the use of other policy
measures to support domestic industry is already regulated. Based on e.g. actual and
proposed tax reforms in the EU, a natural approach could be to require that R&D subsidies
are harmonized between the countries. If the countries harmonize their R&D subsidies to
a common level in our context, the outcome where one firm monopolizes the market is
avoided. Somewhat surprisingly, this is not necessarily welfare maximizing. If the two
goods are suﬃciently close substitutes, it will not be optimal from society’s point of view
to invest in process innovation in both firms. Hence, the optimal cooperative R&D policy
for the two countries could be to subsidize R&D in one of the countries, but not in the
other. In fact, it may even be optimal to tax R&D in the other country. The intuition is
that the consumers do not gain very much from having access to diﬀerent varieties if the
goods are close substitutes. So to avoid duplication of the investment costs, the first-best
cooperative policy could be to stimulate R&D in one firm and reduce the R&D incentives
in the other.
Little research has been done on the links between trade liberalization and R&D
policies, and we are not aware of any other studies showing how trade liberalization may
increase private and social incentives to invest in R&D and thus lead firms to sell more
both domestically and abroad even in absence of strategic interactions. However, starting
with Spencer and Brander (1983), there is a large literature focusing on the business-
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stealing motive for subsidizing R&D. This focus can partly be explained by the fact that
international agreements prohibit the use of, for instance, pure export subsidies. In such
settings Neary and Leahy (2000) emphasize the important point that R&D policies may
be a second-best option to support domestic firms in international markets. Moreover,
Bagwell and Staiger (1994), Brander (1995) and Leahy and Neary (2001a) have found
that R&D subsidies can be a more robust instrument than export policies. It should be
noted, though, that these studies typically abstract from consumer-surplus eﬀects and
make the simplifying assumption that all production is exported to a third market. This
strand of literature thus argues that policy competition tends to result in excessive R&D
from the subsidising countries’ point of view.2
D’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) initiated a wave of research that analyzes the con-
sequences of R&D cooperation between firms that compete in the end-user market. Both
D’Aspremont and Jacquemin and later studies have found that this kind of cooperation
may be welfare improving and increase industry profit.3 However, Salant and Shaﬀer (1998
and 1999) and Amir and Wooders (1998) point to the fact that these studies presuppose
that the firms choose the same level of R&D and sell the same quantities, while the opti-
mal solution may actually be asymmetric.4 In particular, Salant and Shaﬀer (1999) deal
with the fact that it may be optimal to treat ex ante identical agents unequally if there
is Cournot competition in the product market. Hence, the symmetric equilibria identified
in the literature may not represent optimal outcomes. Leahy and Neary (2004) relate the
results from Salant and Shaﬀer to the question of whether the second-order conditions
2Leahy and Neary (2001b) and Haaland and Kind (2004) depart from the simplification of looking
only at third-market exports, and focus directly on domestic consumer surplus eﬀects of R&D subsidies.
The latter study shows that policy competition gives ”wrong” subsidies, but not necessarily too high
subsidies, compared to a solution where the countries set R&D subsidies cooperatively. If goods are
close substitutes, policy competition implies too high subsidies; if on the other hand, goods are fairly
diﬀerentiated, a coordinated solution would give higher subsidies than the non-cooperative outcome of
the policy competition.
3See also Leahy and Neary (1997) for an analysis of similar questions in a more general setting.
4Interestingly, Amir and Wooders show that aggregate industry profit may be higher in an asymmetric
equilibrium with R&D competition between firms than in a symmetric equilibrium where the firms choose
R&D expenditure cooperatively.
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for a symmetric equilibrium are satisfied, and discuss more generally how to interpret the
results regarding symmetric versus asymmetric outcomes.
Our analysis relates to this recent line of literature in its emphasis on the possibilities
of asymmetric equilibria. However, we focus on competition or cooperation at the policy
stage, whereas Leahy and Neary (2004) and most of the other studies look at R&D coop-
eration between firms and abstract from subsidization issues. Moreover, while most of the
previous studies assume Cournot competition with homogeneous products, we introduce
product diﬀerentiation, and show that the degree of diﬀerentiation is, indeed, decisive for
the type of equilibrium in the market. Hence, our focus is a diﬀerent one (policy rather
than firms’ behaviour) and our results are more general, in the sense that we show the
importance of product diﬀerentiation (and hence competition) for the actual equilibrium
in the market.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: After a brief introduction of the model,
we focus on the relationship between trade costs and R&D decisions for the monopoly case
in section 2.1. In section 3.1 we show similar eﬀects with Cournot competition between
two firms. In section 3.2 policy competition is the focus, and in 3.3 policy cooperation.
In both cases the possibilities of unstable and asymmetric equilibria are analysed in some
detail. Section 4 draws some conclusions.
2 The model
Demand side
We employ a model with two intrinsically symmetric countries and two firms. Firm 1
is located in and owned by residents of Country 1, while Firm 2 is located in and owned
by residents of Country 2. The population size in each country is equal to 1, and the
utility function of a representative consumer is given by
Ui = αqii + αqji −
µ
q2ii
2
+
q2ji
2
+ bqiiqji
¶
, (1)
where qii and qji are consumption of the goods produced by the domestic and the foreign
firm, respectively. The first subscript thus indicates in which country the good is produced,
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and the second subscript in which country the good is consumed.
Equation (1) is a standard quadratic utility function where the parameter b ∈ [0, 1)
measures the degree of horizontal diﬀerentiation between the goods; the goods are com-
pletely independent if b = 0, while they are identical in the limit b = 1. More generally,
the two goods are closer substitutes from the consumers’ point of view the higher is b.
Letting pii and pji denote the end-user prices of the two goods in country i, we may
express consumer surplus as CSi = Ui − piiqii − pjiqji. Provided that trade takes place,
optimal consumer behaviour implies that ∂CSi/∂qii = ∂CSi/∂qji = 0. From this we find
that the inverse demand curves are given by
pii = α− (qii + bqji) and pji = α− (qji + bqii) . (2)
Supply side
The firm located in country i incurs trade costs τ ≥ 0 per unit it exports to country
j. We emphasize that trade costs in our setting are exogenously given, and should be
interpreted as a synthetic measure of a wide range of barriers to trade including transport
costs, costs of frontier formalities, and diﬀering product standards. We do not consider
revenue-generating tariﬀs, as these are typically of limited importance in trade between
industrialized countries.
In absence of R&D investments the marginal production cost of firm i is equal to c.
In this case the profit margins on domestic sales and exports are given by (pii − c) and
(pij − c− τ) , respectively. However, each firm may invest in R&D in order to reduce its
marginal costs. More specifically, firm i reduces its marginal production costs to (c− xi)
by investing C(xi) = x2i + f in process innovation, where the parameter f ≥ 0 represents
the fixed costs of setting up an R&D project. We may thus write the profit function of
firm i as
πi = [pii − (c− xi)]qii + [pij − (c− xi)− τ ]qij − x2i − f + sixi, (3)
where si is the R&D subsidy level the firm receives from its domestic government.
Clearly, the firms may find it optimal to invest in R&D until marginal costs equal
zero if (α− c) is suﬃciently large. We shall assume that (α− c) is not so high that this
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happens.5
Welfare in each country is given by the sum of domestic consumer surplus and profit
minus R&D subsidies:
Wi = CSi + πi − sixi. (4)
Note that consumer surplus may be written as
CSi =
1
2
¡
q2ii + q
2
ji
¢
+ bqiiqji. (5)
In the following we consider a two-stage game, where the governments set R&D sub-
sidies at stage 1 and the firms decide quantities and R&D levels at stage 2 (other timing-
structures are discussed in section 4).
2.1 Benchmark: Optimal R&D subsidies to a monopoly
As a benchmark we assume that the firms are monopolies in their own market segments,
which amounts to setting b = 0. This means that there are no strategic interactions
between the firms, so that they choose R&D investments and output independent of each
other.
Holding R&D investments fixed, profit maximizing output for firm i is found by setting
∂πi/∂qii = ∂πi/∂qij = 0 if there is trade. This yields monopoly outputs
qii =
α− (c− xi)
2
and qij =
α− τ − (c− xi)
2
. (6)
Suppose f is suﬃciently small that the firm chooses to invest in R&D. The cost of
increasing R&D investment by one unit is equal to (2xi − si) , while the benefit - in terms
of reduced marginal production costs - equals (qii + qij). The benefit is thus increasing in
total output. Profit maximizing behaviour implies that (2xi − si) = (qii + qij) , or
xi =
qii + qij + si
2
. (7)
5A suﬃcient condition for marginal costs (c− xi) to be positive, is that c/α ≥ 4/5. See footnote 17 in
the Appendix.
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Combining (6) and (7) we find that output equals
qii = (α− c) +
si
2
− τ
4
and qij = (α− c) +
si
2
− 3τ
4
(8)
while R&D investment is
xi = (α− c) + si −
τ
2
. (9)
Not surprisingly, we see that export is decreasing in the level of trade costs. More inter-
estingly, the same is true also for domestic sales and R&D investments. The reason for
the latter is that higher trade costs reduce export and thus the firm’s willingness to invest
in cost reductions. This leads to higher marginal production costs (c− xi) and therefore
lower output also domestically.
It is well known from e.g. Spencer and Brander (1983) that a government may have
incentives to grant R&D subsidies to domestic firms in order to improve their competitive
position. This has been labelled the ”business-stealing eﬀect” in the literature. But there
are no strategic interactions between the firms if b = 0, and therefore no business-stealing
eﬀect. Consequently, the government in country i cannot use R&D subsidies to increase
profit net of R&D subsidies for its domestic firm;
∂ (πi − sixi)
∂si
= −si < 0 for si > 0. (10)
Hence, if R&D subsidies are granted, it must be because of increased consumer surplus.
The monopoly charges a lower price the lower the marginal production costs. Therefore
consumer surplus is increasing in cost-reducing R&D expenditure. However, the firm does
not take this eﬀect into account when deciding how much to invest in R&D. In order
to correct for this, the government has incentives to grant R&D subsidies and increase
domestic consumer surplus (also foreign consumer surplus increases, but this is irrelevant
for the government in country i). Using equations (5) and (8) with b = 0 we find
∂CSi
∂si
=
1
2
qii > 0. (11)
The consumers gain more from a given price reduction the more they consume of the
good. This explains why ∂CSi/∂si is increasing in qii. Since output is higher the lower
the level of trade costs, equation (11) therefore indicates that the government should
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optimally increase the subsidy level if trade costs fall. Formally, setting ∂Wi/∂si =
∂ (πi − sixi) /∂si + ∂CSi/∂si = 0 we have (with superscript M for monopoly):
sMi =
4 (α− c)− τ
6
;
∂sMi
∂τ
< 0. (12)
We can now state:
Proposition 1: Suppose that the firms are monopolists in their own market segments.
The governments will then subsidize domestic R&D. Trade liberalization (dτ < 0) makes
it optimal to increase the subsidy level.
As noted above, there are no strategic interactions between the firms (or the govern-
ments) if b = 0. The mechanisms through which trade makes it optimal for governments
to subsidize R&D are therefore qualitatively diﬀerent from those that have been analyzed
in strategic trade policy papers. Indeed, the only reason why the governments increase
R&D subsidies when trade costs are reduced in the present context, is that this makes
the domestic economy more eﬃcient. The output of the R&D project - here more cost
eﬃcient production technologies - is a non-rival good that should be provided in a greater
quantity the larger the activity level of the firm. Other things equal, trade liberalization
increases total output and therefore makes it optimal to invest more in R&D both from
a private and social point of view.
3 R&D policies with possible intra-industry trade
In the rest of the paper we assume that b ∈ (0, 1) , which means that the two goods
are imperfect substitutes. It should be noted that the standard quadratic utility function
described by equation (1) has the realistic feature that total market demand is decreasing
in b, all else equal.6 This reflects the common assumption that consumers have convex
preferences, so that the size of the market tends to be smaller the less diﬀerentiated the
goods.
6This is most easily seen by assuming that the goods are sold at a fixed price p¯. We then find that
consumer demand is given by qii = qji = (α− p¯) / (1 + b) .
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3.1 Market equilibrium
At the last stage the firms simultaneously choose quantities and R&D investments. An
equilibrium with intra-industry trade is thus given by ∂πi/∂xi = ∂πi/∂qii = ∂πi/∂qij = 0.
Holding quantities fixed, we find that ∂πi/∂xi = 0 implies
xi =
qii + qij + si
2
, (13)
which is the same expression as we had for the monopoly. The incentives to invest in cost
reduction are consequently also in this case increasing in total output and the subsidy
level. Solving ∂πi/∂qii = ∂πi/∂qij = 0 when we hold R&D investments fixed we further
have
qii =
1
2 + b
(α− c) + b
4− b2 τ +
2xi − bxj
4− b2 (14)
qij =
1
2 + b
(α− c)− 2
4− b2 τ +
2xi − bxj
4− b2 .
Higher trade costs make the home market more protected from foreign competition. For
any given R&D investment, we therefore find a positive relationship between domestic
sales and trade costs. However, the direct eﬀect of higher trade costs is to reduce export,
and it is easily verified that total sales for each firm are decreasing in τ (∂ (qii + qij) /∂τ <
0).Equation (13) therefore shows that higher trade costs lead to less investments in cost-
reducing R&D. This eﬀect suggests that also domestic sales may decrease in τ . Indeed,
from the analysis above we know that this is true in the monopoly case, and by combining
(13) and (14) we find
qii =
1
1 + b
(α− c)− 1− 2b
2(2− b)(1 + b)τ +
si − bsj
2 (1− b2)
(15)
qij =
1
1 + b
(α− c)− 3
2 (2− b) (1 + b)τ +
si − bsj
2 (1− b2) .
while
xi =
1
1 + b
(α− c)− 1
2 (1 + b)
τ +
2− b2
2 (1− b2)si −
b
2 (1− b2)sj. (16)
From (15) and (16) we have the following:
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Proposition 2: Holding subsidies fixed, trade liberalization (dτ < 0) leads to higher
domestic output if b < 1/2 and to higher export and more R&D investments for all
b ∈ [0, 1) .
For b > 1/2 the import-competition eﬀect dominates over the R&D eﬀect; hence,
domestic sales go down.
3.2 R&D policy competition
In this section, we assume that the governments non-cooperatively choose subsidy levels
so as to maximize domestic welfare at stage 1. We start out by analyzing the first-order
conditions, but shall subsequently show that the FOCs do not represent a (unique) equi-
librium if the goods are suﬃciently close substitutes.
First-order conditions with R&D policy competition
At stage 1 the countries simultaneously solve ∂Wi/∂si = 0. This gives rise to a sym-
metric outcome given by s1 = s2 ≡ sPC (superscript PC for policy competition):
sPC =
2 (1 + b2)
3 + 4b− 3b2 − 2b3 (α− c)−
1− 2b+ 3b2
(2− b) (3 + 4b− 3b2 − 2b3)τ . (17)
Inserting for (17) into (16) and defining x1 = x2 ≡ xPC we further find
xPC =
5− b2
3 + 4b− 3b2 − 2b3 (α− c)−
4− 3b+ b3
(2− b) (3 + 4b− 3b2 − 2b3)τ . (18)
The subsidy level and R&D investments are thus decreasing in τ , which is what we
should expect from the monopoly case. However, diﬀerentiating equations (17) and (18)
with respect to b, we find that both sPC and xPC are at first decreasing in b and then
increasing. This hinges on the fact that there are two opposing eﬀects of a change in b. On
the one hand, an increase in b means that the size of the market decreases. In isolation,
this market size eﬀect gives rise to smaller subsidies the larger is b. On the other hand,
a larger b also means that the consumers perceive the goods to be better substitutes.
Thereby demand becomes more price sensitive, giving each country greater incentives to
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create a competitive advantage for its home firm by subsidizing cost-reducing R&D. This
business-stealing motive is stronger the better substitutes the goods are, and dominates
over the market size eﬀect for suﬃciently high values of b. Indeed, both sPC and xPC
reach a maximum at b = 1, even though this is the point where the size of the market is
smallest.7
The U-shaped relationship between sPC and b is shown in the left-hand side panel of
Figure 1. The Figure also illustrates that trade liberalization (trade costs reduced from
τ = 1/4 to τ = 0) gives rise to a positive vertical shift in the curve sPC .
The curve labelled MC(s = 0) in the right-hand side panel of Figure 1 shows that
marginal costs (MC = c−xi) are increasing in b if the firms do not receive R&D subsidies.
This reflects the negative relationship between b and the size of the market. With subsidies,
on the other hand, marginal costs are lowest at b = 1.8
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
b
sPC
τ = 1/4
τ = 0
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
b
MC
MC(s=0)
MC(s=sPC)
Figure 1: FOCs for subsidy levels and marginal costs with policy competition.
7At b = 0 we have sPCb=0 =
2
3α−
2
3c−
1
6τ and x
PC
b=0 =
5
3α−
5
3c−
2
3τ , while s
PC
b=1 = x
PC
b=1 = 2α− 2c− τ .
Inserting for this into equation (15) we find that sPCb=1 > s
PC
b=0 and x
PC
b=1 > x
PC
b=0 whenever τ is so small
that trade takes place.
8In all the figures we assume that α = 1 and c = 0.8.
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Equilibrium with R&D policy competition
We shall now analyze whether the first-order conditions for subsidies characterize a
(unique) equilibrium. To this end we have to check the second-order conditions and the
stability of the system. In order to simplify the algebra, we shall in the following assume
that τ = 0.
It is straight forward to show that the second-order conditions for the firms’ choice
of quantities and R&D investments at stage 2 are satisfied. However, when the countries
compete in subsidies at stage 1 we find that
∂2Wi
∂s2i
= −(3− b
2) (1− 2b2)
4 (1− b2)2
,
which means that the second-order conditions hold iﬀ b < bSOC ≡ (1/2)
√
2 ≈ 0.707.
Solving Wi/∂si = 0 for the range of b where the second-order conditions are satisfied,
we find the reaction function
si(sj) =
2 (1− b) (1 + b2)
(3− b2) (1− 2b2) (α− c)−
(1 + b2) b
(3− b2) (1− 2b2)sj. (19)
The system is stable if
¯¯¯
∂si(sj)
∂sj
¯¯¯
< 1. From equation (19) we find that this is satisfied if
and only if b is below some critical value b0, where b0 ≈ 0.591.
The reaction curves s1(s2) and s2(s1) are illustrated in Figure 2. The left-hand side
panel of Figure 2 shows the reaction curves with b = 0.5 < b0, in which case the stability
conditions are satisfied. If the countries initially have diﬀerent subsidy levels - s1 > s2,
say - then each country’s best response to the other country’s subsidy level leads to a
convergence where the countries eventually end up with the same subsidies.9 The stability
conditions are, however, not satisfied in the right-hand side panel of Figure 2, where
b = 0.65 > b0. Here the figure indicates that we eventually end up with a positive subsidy
level in Country 1 and zero subsidies in Country 2 if initially s1 > s2. The reason is that
for b > b0 the goods are such close substitutes that one of the countries may find it optimal
to set suﬃciently high subsidy levels that its domestic firm captures the whole market.
9Here we follow the conventions in the literature and use the terms ”reaction” and ”response” even
though the countries set the subsidy levels simultaneously.
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Note that it is suﬃcient for country 1 to set s1 = sA1 in order to ensure that Country 2
sets s2 = 0 (where sA1 > s
PC).
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
s1(s2)
s2(s1)
s1
s2
s1A
s2A
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
s1(s2)
s2(s1)
s1
s2
b < b’ b > b’
Figure 2: Stability in R&D competition.
The right-hand side panel of Figure 2 thus suggests that we have two stable asym-
metric equilibria (where only one of the countries grants R&D subsidies) if the symmetric
equilibrium is unstable. To verify this, assume that b ∈
¡
b0, bSOC
¢
, i.e., in the range where
the system is unstable but the second-order conditions hold. Suppose Country 1 believes
that Country 2 sets s2 = 0. Maximizing welfare in Country 1 with respect to s1 under the
restriction that output and R&D investments in Firm 2 are non-negative, we have (with
superscript A for asymmetry)
sA1 =
2 (1− b)
b
(α− c) (20)
Inserting for sA1 and s2 = 0 into equations (15) and (16) we find that Firm 2 will be inac-
tive (q22 = q21 = x2 = 0). Given that s2 = 0, it is thus optimal for Country 1 to grant such
high subsidies that Firm 1 becomes a monopolist. However, comparing with the monopoly
subsidy level sM1 (see equation (12)), we find that s
A
1 − sM1 = 2 (3− 4b) (α− c) / (3b) > 0
in the relevant area of b. Country 1 must therefore use a subsidy level which is higher
than its first-best choice.10
10Country 1 is aware of the fact that the foreign firm at stage 2 invests in R&D and supplies a positive
output if s2 = 0 and s1 < sA1 . As this would have a negative welfare eﬀect in Country 1, it is optimal to
set s1 = sA1 > s
M
1 .
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Next, suppose that Country 2 believes s1 = sA1 . We then find
∂W2
∂s2
= −(3− b
2) (1− 2b2)
4 (1− b2)2
s2 < 0 for s2 > 0 and b < 0.707,
from which it follows that Country 2’s best response to s1 = sA1 is s
A
2 = 0.
We now have:
Proposition 3: The symmetric equilibrium is stable for b ∈ [0, b0) and unstable for
b ∈
¡
b0, bSOC
¢
. For b ∈
¡
b0, bSOC
¢
there exist two stable equilibria with sAi =
2(1−b)
b (α− c)
and sAj = 0 (or vice versa). The subsidy level s
A
i is decreasing in b. Production is equal
to zero in the firm that does not receive subsidies.
The subsidy level sAi is decreasing in b because the cost advantage that Country 1 will
have to grant its domestic firm in order to foreclose Firm 2 is smaller the less diﬀerentiated
the consumers perceive the goods to be.
We have now characterized the equilibrium for b ∈
£
0, bSOC
¢
. For higher values of b
there does not exist any equilibrium in pure strategies if the fixed costs f of setting up
a research project equal zero. This is due to the fact that the business-stealing eﬀect is
then so strong that each country has an incentive to overbid the other in subsidy levels.
Indeed, as shown by equation (15), the firms become infinitely sensitive to diﬀerences
in subsidy levels in the limit b → 1. However, with a fixed cost of setting up research
projects, it takes more than a marginal increase in profits to benefit from positive R&D
investments, and in the Appendix we show that there exist stable asymmetric equilibria
in pure strategies if f is suﬃciently high. This equilibrium has the following properties:
Proposition 4: Assume that b > bSOC . There does not exist any equilibrium in pure
strategies if f < (7/9) (α− c)2 . If f > (7/9) (α− c)2 there exist stable asymmetric equi-
libria where one country does not provide R&D subsidies (sj = 0) and the other coun-
try sets si = sAi =
2(1−b)
b (α− c) for b ≤ b00 ≡ 3/4 and si = sMi = 2 (α− c) /3 for
b ∈ [b00, 1) . Production is equal to zero in the firm that does not receive subsidies.
Figure 3 illustrates the equilibrium subsidy levels for the case where f is suﬃciently
high to ensure the existence of equilibria in pure strategies for all b ∈ [0, 1) . Note in
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particular that the subsidy level used by Country 1 is the same if the firms produce
independent goods (b = 0) as if b ∈ [b00, 1) . Even if Country 1 could foreclose Firm 2 from
the market by setting s1 = sA1 in the latter area of b, that would yield a subsidy level
lower than the welfare-maximizing one for Country 1.
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Figure 3: Equilibrium subsidy levels with policy competition.
3.3 Policy cooperation
The above analysis shows that there is a rationale for national governments to subsidize
R&D; however, there are at least two reasons why the national subsidies are not optimal
from a global point of view. First, national governments do not take costs and benefits
for foreign consumers into consideration; second, the business-stealing motive and the
accompanying policy competition cannot be optimal in a global sense. Hence, there is a
need for international policy cooperation; however, it is not obvious what type of cooper-
ation this should be. A natural approach, motivated by the literature on tax competition,
would be to argue for harmonization of subsidies across countries. If R&D subsidies are
bound to be at the same level in the two countries, there will be no policy game, and the
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subsidies could be used to correct for the public-goods aspects of R&D. In section 3.3.1
harmonized R&D policies are studied, and the implications of such policies are discussed.
Harmonization of R&D subsidies implies a symmetric outcome in the two countries, with
the same R&D levels and identical quantities produced and sold. While such a symmetric
outcome may seem reasonable given that the countries and the firms are symmetric, it
is, in fact, not always welfare maximizing from a global point of view. In section 3.3.2
we study optimal cooperative policies, and show that depending on the degree of product
diﬀerentiation, the optimal global solution could either be one with the same subsidies to
both firms or one where only one of the firms is subsidized.
3.3.1 Optimal harmonized R&D subsidies
Suppose that the countries harmonize their R&D subsidies at a common level s1 = s2 ≡ s .
An optimal harmonization policy requires that the common subsidy level is chosen so as
to maximize aggregate welfare, which is given by
W =W1 +W2. (21)
Assuming that the fixed R&D costs f are suﬃciently small that both firms perform
R&D, we solve ∂W/∂s = 0 to find that the subsidy level is given by (with superscript H
for harmonization):11
sH =
2
1 + 3b+ b2
(α− c) ; ∂s
H
∂b
< 0. (22)
The subsidy level is thus monotonically decreasing in b. This is true for two reasons.
First, because the size of the market is decreasing in b. Second, because there is stronger
competition between the firms the less diﬀerentiated goods they produce. All else equal,
higher competition implies that output for each firm increases, and thus their incentives
to invest in cost reduction. This in turn means that the need to provide R&D subsidies
is lower the higher is b.
11The second-order condition equals ∂
2W
∂s2 = −
b2+3b+1
(1+b)2 , and is thus negative for all b ≥ 0.
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Inserting for sH into equation (15) we have
xHi =
3 + b
1 + 3b+ b2
(α− c) ; ∂x
H
i
∂b
< 0.
When the countries harmonize their subsidies, we thus see that the larger is b, the
lower are subsidy levels and R&D investments. The latter implies that marginal costs are
increasing in b, as illustrated in Figure 4.
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Figure 4: Subsidy levels and marginal costs with harmonized subsidies.
We can now state:
Proposition 5: Suppose that the countries choose a common subsidy level that max-
imizes aggregate welfare. Subsidy levels are then lower, and marginal production costs
higher, the closer substitutes the consumers perceive the goods to be.
Using equations (3), (4), (5) and (22) we find that aggregate welfare in this case equals
WH =
2(b+ 3)
b2 + 3b+ 1
(α− c)2 − 2f. (23)
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3.3.2 Optimal cooperative R&D subsidies
The harmonization policy internalizes the business-stealing eﬀect and takes into account
the consumer interests in both countries. However, with this policy the countries have only
one policy instrument at hand; the common subsidy level s. The number of instruments
doubles if the countries allow the subsidy levels s1 and s2 to diﬀer, in which case aggregate
welfare must be at least as high as if a common subsidy level were chosen. Optimal R&D
cooperation between the countries thus solves {s1, s2} = argmax {W} , where s1 S s2.
Solving ∂W/∂si = 0 (i = 1, 2) we find that the first-order conditions still imply si = sH ,
i.e., the same subsidy level as in the case with policy harmonization. However, assume
that for some reason only one good is produced. The optimal subsidy level to be granted
to this firm is12:
si = s
∗
i = 2(α− c) (24)
Recall from equation (12) that si = sMi =
2
3
(α − c) in a non-cooperative equilibrium for
b = 0 . The intuition for why s∗i > s
M
i , is that the cooperative equilibrium maximizes
aggregate welfare, which in particular includes consumer surplus in both countries.
To be specific, suppose that only Firm 1 is active. Letting s1 = s∗1 and setting q22 =
q21 = x2 = 0 we find that welfare equals:
W ∗ = 3 (α− c)2 − f. (25)
Equations (23) and (25) imply that
W ∗ −WH = 3b
2 + 7b− 3
b2 + 3b+ 1
(α− c)2 + f. (26)
Clearly, it may be optimal to produce only one good if f is suﬃciently high (we abstract
from the trivial case where f is so high that it is unprofitable to produce any of the goods).
However, equation (26) implies that aggregate welfare is higher with one than with two
goods even in the limit case where f = 0 if
b > b˜0 ≡ 1
6
(
√
85− 7) ≈ 0.37.
12Technically this is found by setting qjj = qji = 0 and recalculating the system of equations. However,
an easier approach which yields the same result is simply to set b = 0 into equation (22).
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If it is optimal that only Firm 1 produces, the countries should obviously not subsidize
R&D in Firm 2. Indeed, it may be necessary to tax R&D in that firm. To see this, suppose
that Firm 1 receives the socially optimal subsidy level s∗1. From equations (15) and (16)
we then find that a suﬃcient condition to prevent Firm 2 from being active is that
s2 = −2 (1− 2b) (α− c) for b < b˜00
s2 = 0 for b > b˜00,
where b˜00 = 1/2. Thus, if b < b˜00 the countries will have to tax away any incentives that
Firm 2 may have to invest in R&D.13 The required tax level is decreasing in b, reflecting
the fact that Firm 2’s ability to charge a higher price than Firm 1 is smaller the better
substitutes the goods are. If b ≥ b˜00 the goods are such close substitutes that s2 = 0
ensures that Firm 2 will not be competitive.
If f > 0 welfare is higher with only one good than in the symmetric case with two
goods also for b < b˜0. Denote by b˜f the value of b which ensures that W ∗ > WH for any
given value of f ≥ 0. We can now state:
Proposition 6: Suppose that b > b˜f and that the countries can levy R&D taxes to
foreclose one of the firms from the market . The optimal R&D subsidy for the active firm
is s∗i = 2(α−c), and welfare is higher than if both firms are active and receive the optimal
harmonized subsidy level sH . The optimal subsidy level for b < b˜f is si = sj = sH .
By taxing R&D in one of the firms for b > b˜f , the countries are able to prevent
unnecessary duplication of R&D expenses. It may be argued, though, that it is unrealistic
to assume that the countries can tax R&D. Moreover, the foreclosure policy lets one of
the firms monopolize the market, and this leads to higher consumer prices than if both
firms are active. One may therefore conjecture that welfare would be higher if Firm 2 is
only partly foreclosed from the market. However, in the Appendix we prove the following:
Proposition 7. Assume that R&D subsidies must be non-negative and that b > b˜f .
13If f = 0 the marginal cost of doing the first bit of R&D is zero, in which case it is optimal with some
R&D if output is positive. Therefore s2 must be chosen such that q22 = q21 = 0.
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Unless (si, sj) = (2(α− c), 0) completely forecloses one of the firms from the market,
welfare is lower than if the countries can tax R&D.
Above, we noted that the symmetric subsidy level s = sH is optimal for b < b˜f , while
Firm 2 will never be active in the market if s2 = 0 and s1 = 2(α− c) for b > b˜00.14 In these
cases welfare is the same whether or not we allow for R&D taxation. Otherwise there
exists an interval in the range b ∈
³
b˜f , b˜00
´
where Firm 2 will be active if the countries
cannot tax R&D. There are two main reasons for why this has a negative welfare eﬀect.
The first pertains to duplication of R&D costs, as already discussed. The second reason is
that Firm 2 - which does not receive R&D subsidies - will have higher marginal production
costs than Firm 1. For any given industry output, aggregate production costs are thus
minimized if all production takes place in Firm 1.15 This latter eﬀect is precisely the reason
why Salant and Shaﬀer (1999) argue that it may be welfare improving to grant higher
R&D subsidies to one firm than to another even if the firms are intrinsically symmetric.
Figure 5 illustrates the relationship between optimal R&D subsidy levels and b graph-
ically when we allow R&D taxes. For b ≤ b˜0 the firms receive the same subsidy level sH ,
while we have s1 = s∗1 for b > b˜
0. This is the optimal subsidy when only one good is
produced, and is therefore independent of b. R&D taxes ensure that Firm 2 is completely
foreclosed from the market if b ∈
³
b˜0, b˜00
´
, but the need for R&D taxation in that firm is
smaller the less diﬀerentiated goods the firms produce. For b > b˜00 (potential) competition
between the firms is so fierce that it is unnecessary to tax Firm 2.
Both with policy competition (see Figure 3) and with policy cooperation we thus
have that the equilibrium is symmetric for suﬃciently low values of b, while only one
firm is active for higher values of b. In this sense there are clear similarities between
the outcome with policy competition and cooperation, even though the reasons for the
asymmetry are fundamentally diﬀerent.
14This is true even for f = 0.
15In principle the countries could set s1 so high that the cost-reducing R&D investments in Firm 1 are
large enough to keep Firm 2 out of the market for all b > b˜f . However, the convexity of the R&D cost
function implies that this would be too expensive. See Appendix
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Figure 5. Equilibrium subsidy and tax levels with optimal policy cooperation.
4 Concluding remarks
In this paper we have studied optimal industrial R&D investments in an international
setting. In a simple model with two countries hosting one firm each, we have looked
at the firms’ R&D decisions and the governments’ incentives to influence R&D levels
through subsidies. Both non-cooperative policies and coordinated international policies
are studied; for national (non-cooperative) policies there are both a public-goods motive
and a business-stealing motive for R&D policies. With coordinated policies, the business-
stealing motive disappears, while the public-goods motive is reinforced. A number of
interesting conclusions come out of the analysis.
First, it is shown that international trade and trade costs are important for the firms’
choice of R&D as well as for the governments’ optimal policies towards R&D. Liberaliza-
tion implies that the firms find it optimal to increase their cost-reducing R&D investments,
since the market becomes bigger. And higher R&D implies lower marginal costs, lower
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prices and more sales. The government - realizing that the benefits any given level of
R&D support then goes up - finds it optimal to raise the subsidy. Freer international
trade thus implies more R&D, higher R&D subsidies and more sales, possibly also in the
domestic market. The policy eﬀects do not rely on any business-stealing motive; even for
a monopoly it would be the case that optimal R&D subsidies and domestic sales increase
when trade costs go down.
Second, we study in some detail policy competition between two governments pursuing
national interest. Contrary to most of the literature, we explicitly include the eﬀects
for domestic consumers in the analysis. We find that the eﬀects of policy competition
depend critically on the characteristics of the market. If the goods are poor substitutes,
competition between the firms is not very strong, and for the governments the public-good
motive for subsidies is more important than the business-stealing one. In such industries
there will typically be a symmetric outcome, where both governments subsidize R&D in
the domestic firm, and where both firms invest in R&D and sell their products in the two
markets. When the goods are close substitutes, on the other hand, the business-stealing
motive for subsidies dominates, and competition may become so tough that only one firm
survives in the market.
Third, we analyze policy cooperation, and look at the optimal R&D policy from a
global point of view. Given the potentially harmful eﬀects of policy competition, it is not
diﬃcult to see why there is a need for policy coordination. However, contrary to what
one might expect, policy cooperation does not necessarily lead to a harmonization of the
subsidies to the two firms. In fact, our analysis shows that when goods are fairly close
substitutes, an optimal cooperative policy may imply that only one of the firms receives
R&D subsidies, and that the other firm ceases to produce. Hence, the surprising result
is that both with policy competition and policy coordination we may end up with an
asymmetric equilibrium where one firm monopolizes the market.
In the model we have assumed a two-stage game where the firms at the second stage
determine R&D and output simultaneously. Many of the contributions to the literature
assume three stages, such that the firms at the second stage (i.e. after the subsidies are
set) determine the R&D investments, and at the third stage produce and sell the goods.
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This assumption is not critical for our main results. With a three-stage game, there would
be strategic motives for the firms’ R&D decisions in addition to the cost-minimizing ones,
but that would not change our results qualitatively. A second assumption to discuss, is
the specific cost function for R&D. In the analysis it was shown that the fixed costs of
an R&D project could be important for the existence of asymmetric equilibria. The same
applies with respect to the convexity of the cost function. In particular, the existence
of a stable, symmetric equilibrium is more likely the more convex the cost function (see
also Leahy and Neary, 2004). Hence, the exact outcomes that we find may depend on
the specific cost function. However, the main conclusions regarding the eﬀects of trade
liberalization and the possibilities of asymmetric as well as symmetric equilibria remain
valid also with more general R&D functions.
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5 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 4:
Assume that b > bSOC , in which case ∂2Wi/∂s2i > 0. If neither country grants subsidies
we find that
W s=0i =
2 + b
(1 + b)2
(α− c)2 − f.
This is an equilibrium if none of the countries has incentives to depart from zero
subsidies. However, with s2 = 0 we find
∂W1
∂s1
=
(1 + b2)
2 (1 + b)2 (1− b)
(α− c) + (3− b
2) (2b2 − 1)
4 (1− b2)2
s1 > 0, (27)
which means that welfare in Country 1 is monotonically increasing in s1. This implies
that Country 1 will choose a subsidy level which is so high that Firm 2 is foreclosed
from the market. The first-best subsidy level for Country 1 if Firm 2 is foreclosed, is the
monopoly subsidy level sM1 = 2 (α− c) /3. However, Firm 2 will not be foreclosed as long
as sA1 =
2(1−b)
b (α− c) > sM1 , which is true for b < b00.
We will now analyze the cases b ∈
£
bSOC , b00
¤
and b ∈ [b00, 1] separately.
Case A: b ∈
£
bSOC , b00
¤
.
In order to ensure q22 = q21 = 0 at stage 2 for b ∈
£
bSOC , b00
¤
, Country 1’s best response
to s2 = 0 is sA1 =
2(1−b)
b (α− c) (the same as in the range b ∈
¡
b0, bSOC
¢
. This subsidy level
is higher than Country 1’s first-best subsidy, but the lowest which forecloses the foreign
firm at stage 2.
With (s1, s2) =
¡
sA1 , 0
¢
we find that welfare in the two countries equals
WA1 =
8b− 2b2 − 3
2b2
(α− c)2 − f and WA2 =
(α− c)2
2b2
.
Since
WA1 > W
s=0
1 ,
it follows that Country 1’s best response to s2 = 0 is s1 = sA1 also for b ∈
£
bSOC , b00
¤
.
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What is Country 2’s best response to s1 = sA1 ? Setting s1 = s
A
1 we have
∂W2
∂s2
=
(3− b2) (2b2 − 1)
4 (1− b2)2
s2 > 0 for s2 > 0.
This means that if Firm 2 performs R&D, then it will be optimal for Country 2 to grant
subsidies which foreclose Firm 1 from the market (in which case Country 1’s belief that
s2 = 0 and that Firm 2 is foreclosed from the market is wrong). Solving q11 = q12 = 0
with respect to s2 for s1 = sA1 we find s
0
2 =
2(1−b2)
b2 (α− c) and
W
0
2 =
8b2 − 2b4 − 3
2b4
(α− c)2 − f.
Given that s1 = sA1 , it is not profitable for Country 2 to grant subsidies ifW
A
2 > W
0
2. This
inequality holds if
f > f 0 ≡ (3− b
2) (2b2 − 1)
2b4
(α− c)2 ,
which reaches a maximum at b = b00, where f
0
= (13/27) (α− c)2 . We can therefore
conclude that there exists an asymmetric equilibrium (si, sj) =
³
2(1−b)
b (α− c) , 0
´
for
b ∈
£
bSOC , b00
¤
if f > (13/27) (α− c)2 .16
Case B: b ∈ [b00, 1)
Given that s2 = 0 and b ∈ [b00, 1) , Country 1 will use its first-best subsidy level s1 = sM1
to foreclose Firm 2 from the market. Welfare in the two countries is then equal to
WB1 =
15
9
(α− c)2 − f and
WB2 =
8
9
(α− c)2 .
Using the same procedure as above, we find that Country 2’s best response to s1 = sM1
is s2 =
2(4−3b)
3b (α− c) or s2 = 0, depending on the size of the fixed costs. With the subsidy
levels
¡
s1, s
00
2
¢
=
³
sM1 ,
2(4−3b)
3b (α− c)
´
we have
W 002 =
16b− 3b2 − 8
3b2
(α− c)2 − f.
16Comparing welfare in the two countries we find WA1 −WA2 > 0 if f < fcrit ≡ 4b−b
2−2
b2 (α− c)
2
.
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Subtracting WB2 −W 002 we find that s2 = 0 is Country 2’s best response to s1 = sM1 for all
b ∈ [b00, 1) if
f >
7
9
(α− c)2 .
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 7
The second-order conditions for optimal subsidies when the subsidy levels may diﬀer
are
∂2W
∂s2i
= −1− 4b
2 + b4
2 (1− b2)2
< 0 for b <
1
2
³√
6−
√
2
´
≈ 0. 52µ
∂2W
∂s2i
¶µ
∂2W
∂s2j
¶
−
µ
∂2W
∂si∂sj
¶2
=
1− 7b2 + b4
4 (1− b2)2
> 0 for b <
1
2
³
3−
√
5
´
= 0.38,
which means that the SOCs are satisfied only if b < bˆSOC ≡ 1
2
(3−
√
5) = 0.38. For b < bˆSOC
we therefore have a local optimum with symmetric subsidies (this corresponds to what
Leahy and Neary (2004) label Restricted Cooperative Substitutability). However, this is
not necessarily a global optimum, since we know from equation (26) that
¡
W ∗ −WH
¢
> 0
if b > b˜f , where ∂b˜f/∂f < 0 and b˜f = b˜0 ≡ 1
6
¡√
85− 7
¢
≈ 0.37 for f = 0.
Suppose that f = 0. For b > b˜0 we then have to look for corner solutions. It is straight
forward to show that it is inoptimal to set s1 = s2 = 0. This leaves us with the following
candidates for optimum:
I) Set s2 = 0 and choose a welfare maximizing level of s1, possibly without foreclosing
Firm 2 (alternatively, choose s2 optimally, given that s1 = 0)
II) Set s2 = 0, and choose s1 such that Firm 2 is completely foreclosed (alternatively,
set s1 = 0, and choose s2 such that Firm 1 is completely foreclosed)
III) Set s1 at the optimal level, given that only Firm 1 is present in the market
(alternatively, set s2 at the optimal level, given that only Firm 2 is present in the market).
IV) Set s1 optimally, given that Firm 2 is foreclosed by setting s2 ≤ 0.
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Case I:
Setting s2 = 0 we have
∂2W
∂s21
= −1
2
b4 − 4b2 + 1
(b− 1)2 (1 + b)2
< 0 for b <
1
2
³√
6−
√
2
´
≈ 0.52.
Provided that all non-negativity constraints are satisfied, we can solve ∂W/∂s1 = 0 to
find (with superscript to signify Case I):
sI1 =
2 (1− b)2
b4 − 4b2 + 1 (α− c) ;
∂sI1
∂b
> 0. (28)
Inserting for s1 and s2 into equation (16) we find
xI1 =
3− 5b+ b3
1− 4b2 + b4 (α− c)
and17
xI2 =
b3 − b2 − 2b+ 1
1− 4b2 + b4 (α− c) .
We now have xI2 > 0 for b < bˆ
0 ≡ 0.44, in which case welfare is given by
W I =
2b3 − 10b+ 5
1− 4b2 + b4 (α− c)
2
. (29)
Case II:
Setting s2 = 0 we find that q22 = q21 = x2 = 0 if
sII1 = s
A
1 = 2
1− b
b
(α− c) . (30)
Equations (16) and (30) yield
xII1 =
2− b
b
(α− c)
and
W II =
4b− b2 − 1
b2
(α− c)2 . (31)
17From this we find that a suﬃcient condition for c− x1 > 0 is that c/α > 0.778.
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Case III:
Given that Firm 2 does not produce, the optimal subsidy level to Firm 1 equals18
sIII1 = 2(α− c) = s∗1, (32)
from which it follows that
xIII1 = 3(α− c).
This yields the welfare level
W III = 3 (α− c)2 . (33)
Case III is relevant only if s2 = 0 and s1 = sIII1 do not lead Firm 2 to invest in R&D
and produce at stage 2. Using equations (15) and (16) we find that this holds for b ≥ b˜00.
Case IV:
Suppose the countries set s1 = sIII1 . From equation (15) we find that (q22 + q21) = 0 if
sIV2 = −2 (1− 2b) (α− c) < 0 for b < 1/2. (34)
In this case Firm 2 will not produce or invest in R&D, and we therefore have
W IV = 3 (α− c)2 . (35)
Proof that welfare is highest with complete foreclosure of Firm 2 if b > b˜0:
Comparing equations (29), (31) and (35) we find that welfare is highest in Case IV,
where R&D taxes imply that Firm 2 is inactive. It can further be shown that welfare is
higher by choosing s2 = sIV2 than by setting s2 such that x2 = 0; in the latter case Firm 2
would have positive output for b < 0.47 with an optimal choice of s1 (even though it does
not invest in R&D). If we allow R&D taxes, we thus see that the countries would prefer
to completely foreclose Firm 2 from the market for b > b˜0. Q.E.D.
Equilibrium if R&D taxes are not available:
Suppose that we require si ≥ 0. Comparing equations (29) and (31) we then have that
welfare is highest if Firm 2 is not completely foreclosed from the market for b < bˆ0. We
18This is most easily found by setting b = 0 in equation (22).
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further find from equations (31) and (33) that welfare is higher with s1 = sIII1 than with
s1 = s
II
1 , which is feasible for b > b˜
00.
Figure A1 shows the relationship between R&D subsidies and b if R&D taxes are not
available and f = 0. For b ∈
³
bSOC , bˆ0
´
the optimal non-negative subsidies are s2 = 0 and
s1 = s
I
1. In this area Firm 2 will produce and invest in R&D; complete foreclosure of Firm
2 through granting suﬃciently high subsidies to Firm 1 would be too expensive. This is
due to the convexity of the R&D cost function and the relatively low competitive pressure
between the firms when b is ’small’. Additionally, there is also a gain for the consumers of
having access to both varieties. This advantage is smaller, though, the less diﬀerentiated
the goods are. Therefore sA1 is increasing in b.
For b ∈
³
bˆ0, b˜00
´
we have s1 = sII1 . The goods are then such close substitutes that it is
beneficial for the countries to completely foreclose Firm 2 from the market by providing
relatively high R&D subsidies to Firm 1. However, given that there is only one good in
the market, this subsidy level is higher than the first-best subsidy level s = sIII1 = s
∗
1.
The latter is obtainable only for b > b˜00, in which case the goods are suﬃciently close
substitutes to make Firm 2 uncompetitive with s2 = 0 and s = sIII1 .
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Figure A1: Equilibrium subsidies with policy cooperation when R&D taxes are not
available.
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